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f new transnational actors on the international scene has considerably 
lobal political landscape.  The increasing number of multinational corporations, 
inal and terrorist groups, and humanitarian and charitable organizations whose 
rders means that states, acting alone, are much less capable of governing global 
g to many observers, this trend means that states have lost their monopoly in 
, becoming just one actor among many on the world stage.1  Particularly for a 
ce, whose identity has long been structured around the primacy of the state, 
e of state capacity is sometimes lamented as the “end of France.”  
role and influence of one type of transnational actornon-governmental 
Os)on French foreign policy has been the source of much controversy in 
ebate. This controversy began with an article by former Foreign Minister 
 Le Monde Diplomatique (December 2000) and, even more so, through his 
e la France à l’heure de la mondialisation.  In these writings, Védrine 
w that “international civil society” is “somewhat of a madhouse or a mirage,” 
e “active minorities, self-designated powers.” He accused these organizations 
s they foster of “lacking transparency,” a position that sparked loud protests 
rom much of the media. 2  The implication was that NGOs posed a serious 
endence of the French state and to the democratic spirit of French society.    
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Védrine’s remarks, however, do not reflect the real state of relations between the French 
government and NGOs. There is no denying that NGOs, although hardly new, have become 
more numerous and visible in recent years.  But far from sapping the vitality of the state, the 
increasing demands of non-governmental actors for state support and for state action in new 
areas have led to an extension of state activity and state capacity.  The French state has often 
used its strong links with non-governmental actors, and the dependence of many types of non-
governmental actors to further its efficacy and span of control.  In the process, the French state 
and French NGOs have together created a new model of diplomacy that defies simplistic notions 
of pure state sovereignty or of stateless, borderless NGOs.     
A Relationship Born of Distrust 
The mutual wariness that initially characterized relations between NGOs and the French states 
has largely dissipated. This wariness was rooted in the highly centralizing tradition of French 
foreign policymaking, which had little patience for any intrusion of civil society in foreign 
affairs, and in the political culture of the non-profit sector, marked by a libertarian nature and a 
resistance to any compromise with the diplomatic corps and the army. Fears of mutual 
exploitation ran high.3  
But over the last decade, most French NGOs have developed close relations with the state. The 
state’s recognition of the “usefulness” of NGOs no longer poses any major problem and the 
government no longer considers NGOs as unwanted intruders.4  The French Foreign Affairs 
Ministry finances several NGOs through two major departments: the Mission pour la 
Coopération Non-Gouvernementale (MCNG) and the Délégation à l’Action Humanitaire.  
Through these programs, the Foreign Affairs Ministry recognizes three major types of “NGOs”: 
(1) the large emergency medical and food aid relief organizations (e.g. Médecins sans Frontières 
[MSF], Médecins du Monde [MdM], Handicap International); (2) religious organizations, such 
as, the Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement (CCFD) and Secours 
Catholique; (3) small organizations specializing in a particular field (education, development 
aid) and others that function as volunteer research centers or cooperatives.5  Strict rules apply to 
granting NGOs subsidies: they must be a non-profit organization according to the terms of the 
law of 1901; they must devote all or part of their activities to international cooperation; and they 
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must have been in existence for at least three years and show proof that they operate as a 
volunteer association.6  
Relations between the state and NGOs have also become institutionalized in the area of 
international cooperation through agencies such as the Commission Coopération Développement 
(CCD), the Haut Conseil de la Coopération Internationale (HCCI) or the Agence Française du 
Développement (AFD). There are moreover many less formal contacts between the authorities 
and human rights NGOs as well as those working in sustainable development. The Foreign 
Affairs Ministry also subsidizes NGOs specializing in conflict resolution, such as the 
International Crisis Group (ICG). Fairly regular contacts exist between the main French NGOs 
and ministerial officials, and even the ministers themselves, the prime minister and the president.   
This rapprochement between NGOs and the state, however, did not occur without posing 
problems for NGOs, some of whom define themselves in part by their independence.  Relations 
with the state inevitably raise the question of NGO “neutrality.”  French NGOs differ widely in 
their attitudes toward the value of neutrality and the importance of influencing French foreign 
policy.  In terms of approach, three major types of organizations can be identified.7 The first type 
includes a few large international NGOs that have the means and the will to exert influence on 
states, such as MSF, MdM, the CCFD and Handicap International.  Only a very few of the many 
French humanitarian organizations fall into this category, but together they account for 80% of 
the funds donated by the public.  They are in a position to rely on a fairly stable network of 
private donors and do not rely on state financial support.  Their resources, although considerable, 
are far below those of the major American, Canadian or British NGOs such as CARE, 
Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Oxfam.8 
Even among these larger French NGOs, only MSF takes a hard-line “independent” stance and 
does not accept any state aid. 
Far behind the first group are active NGOs that are often very effective in the field, but less able 
to attract private donations. These organizations are obliged to dip into the “coffers of 
institutional funding,” that is state budgets and funds from international organizations such as the 
European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) or the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR). They are highly vulnerable and easily exploited by states and international 
organizations, which have the leverage to convince them to intervene in fields chosen in 
accordance with geopolitical aims.  In the third category, “mini-NGOs” are funded publicly or 
through appeals from a specific public figure. They rely on states and international organizations 
for funding, promotion and support for their projects. They have no margin to maneuver without 
risking a break with their financial backers and consequent bankruptcy.  
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In short, there is a huge gap between little local NGOs that send out a few highly-motivated and 
competent volunteers to help dig a well in Africa and what are known as the “majors.”  Only the 
large NGOs can claim to exert any influence on the state.  These larges NGO have become very 
professionalized, but they are increasingly perceived as “bureaucratic” and self-interested.9 
Indeed, they no longer simply do aid and rescue work in the field.  They are also to alert public 
opinion to new issues and are able to mobilize support through large press campaigns. They have 
developed a legal expertise that the state often lacks.  The major humanitarian NGOs, which are 
very active in fields of conflict into which diplomats rarely venture, are a source of information 
for the state, and have prompted it to show more concern for the defense of human rights and 
humanitarian issues.   
The major French NGOs have all diversified their activities, in step with transformations that the 
major Anglo-Saxon NGOs have made. Many of them have set up offices in several countries, 
becoming in effect multinational organizations. The legal expertise they have developed gives 
them a certain degree of clout in international negotiations. They are capable of forming 
international coalitions of NGOs and states, as occurred with the convention for the International 
Criminal Court. They can function on multiple levels, conducting operations, protesting, acting 
as a mouthpiece for their constituents and providing geopolitical analyses of international or 
internal conflicts.  
The Limits of Influence 
But the influence French NGOs supposedly have on state policy is overstated and the resistance 
of states to them underestimated.  Their influence, when it is exerted, is usually only limited and 
partial. There is often a considerable gap between their demands and the results achieved, or 
between image and reality. In the area of humanitarian action, in particular, the specifically 
French grand ambition of humanitarian action “without borders” has led to a total dead end.10 
NGOs are powerless to modify French foreign policy substantially; they are incapable of forcing 
a decision that would run counter to what France sees as its basic interests. Their influence, when 
it is exercised, is confined to issues the state views as secondary. On all issues touching on the 
heart of national sovereignty—security, the model for economic development, strategic 
interests—France, like many other countries, continues to act as it always has, weighing the pros 
and cons according to its own interests. Despite the know-how and devotion of their activists, 
NGOs have no more influence that what the state decides to grant them.11 They have wrested 
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from governments more verbal commitments than actual deeds.  Governments, in very many 
cases, have yielded little more than a few declarations of good intentions. The hard-won 
advances are most often bittersweet victories with outcomes that fall well short of their 
ambitions. Most achievements—the antipersonnel mines treaty, the ICC—are very limited. The 
state remains the indispensable actor without which nothing can be done and the balance of 
forces remains overwhelmingly in its favor. 
The state in France does finance several NGOs and state officials do frequently claim that France 
“needs strong and powerful NGOs in all sectors.”   But they do not do so out of philanthropy.  
Rather, NGOs are now perceived as another avenue of French influence throughout the world.  
They are in a position to convey the French viewpoint effectively in international forums, and 
they can advocate France’s position in international volunteer circles, thus limiting the influence 
of American and British NGOs, many of which make no bones about defending their 
government’s positions.  Even more concerned with sovereignty than other European countries, 
France realized, albeit somewhat late in the day, the advantage that lay in having strong NGOs 
that are able to compete with their foreign counterparts.  
In the field of development aid, NGOs do work that states like France no longer want to do. 
Their presence allows the state to justify its withdrawal and to delegate tasks to the non-profit 
private sector while keeping a certain control over development aid projects via co-financing. 
And they cost less than the private sector, a factor of no small importance. The thinking within 
the government on NGOs is dominated by a sense of pragmatism and realism that has nothing in 
common with the position articulated by Hubert Védrine.  
But there is still a major lack of consistency in the French approach: France is one of the 
European countries that channels the least development aid through NGOs and that relies the 
least on international humanitarian associations.  State officials claim that the state needs to 
maintain a capacity for “state-to-state” international aid.  In fact, France wants to continue to act 
directly without going systematically through NGOs. The question remains whether this position 
is compatible with the desire to have NGOs that are “as powerful as the American ones.”  
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